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A prototype model of stock market is introduced and studied numerically. In this self-organized
system, we consider only the interaction among traders without external influences. Agents trade
according to their own strategy, to accumulate his assets by speculating on the price’s fluctuations
which are produced by themselves. The model reproduced rather realistic price histories whose
statistical properties are also similar to those observed in real markets.
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In the modern market of stocks, currencies, and com-
modities, trading patterns are becoming more and more
global. Market-moving information is being transmit-
ted quickly to all the participants (at least in principle).
However, not all the participants interpret the informa-
tion the same way and react at the same time delay.
In fact, every participant has a certain fixed framework
facing external events. It is well known that the global
market is far from being at equilibrium [1], the collec-
tive behavior of the market can occasionally have violent
bursts (rallies or crushes) and these violent events follow
some empirically well established scaling laws. These are
currently the subject of intensive studies [2–6]. It is not
settled yet whether these fluctuations are due to exter-
nal factors or to the inherent interaction among market’s
players.
From a physicist’s point of view, the market is an ex-
cellent example of self-organized systems: each agent de-
cides according to his own perception of the events. In
the simplest framework, these events consist in the price
fluctuations, the only available information. Each partic-
ipant’s action will in turn influence the price. In a true
economy there are external driving factors, such as pol-
itics, natural disasters, human psychology etc. Another
systematic effect is due to the periodicity of human life
(days, weeks, months and years) which also influences the
dynamics of prices. From the theoretical side, it is inter-
esting to understand whether the statistical properties of
prices depend directly on the external driving factors or
whether they are self generated by the system itself.
In the present work, sticking to a physicist’s point of
view, we shall address this issue by investigating this
system in the absence of external factors. Thus in our
market all the participants are speculators: they trade
with the sole aim to increase their capital. We shall see
that a very rich and complex statistics of price fluctua-
tions emerges from such a closed system of traders which
speculate on the price fluctuations they produce them-
selves. In spite of the simplicity of our model and of
the strategies of the single participants, and the outright
exclusion of economic external factors, we shall find a
market which behaves surprisingly realistically. These
results suggest that a stock market can be considered
as a self-organized critical system: The system reaches
dynamically an equilibrium state characterized by fluc-
tuations of any size, without the need of any parameter
fine tuning or external driving.
Let us define our model more precisely. Each player is
initially given the same amount of capital in two forms:
cash Mi,t=0 and stock Si,t=0. At any time t the capital
of player i is given by Ci,t = Mi,t + ptSi,t, where pt is
the current price of the stock. There is only one stock in
this model, e.g. a foreign currency. All trading consists
of switching back and forth between cash and this stock.
Each player has a strategy that makes recommendation
for buying or selling a certain amount of stock for the
next time step. This depends solely on the information
available, i.e. the past price history. All the players have
equal access to the price history. The actions taken by
each player is bounded by his belongings. Player i can
invest only a fraction of his stocks which, at any time t,
is given by his strategy: At time t, the general form of
the strategy of player i is
Xi,t = Fi[pt, pt−1, . . .]
where Xi,tSi,t is the amount of stock player i decides to
buy (Xi,t > 0) or to sell (Xi,t < 0). Our model draws in-
spiration from Brian Arthur’s model of Bar Attendance
[7], where each bar hopper can formulate his own predic-
tion, based on the past observation. This shows that, in a
game of interacting strategies, the measure of a strategy’s
efficacy can be given only a posteriori. Any strategy is, a
priori, as good as any other. Therefore, in our case, ini-
tially the strategies are randomly chosen. Then, at each
time step, the agent with the smallest capital is elimi-
nated and replaced by one with a new (random) strategy.
This refreshing rule keeps the population of the traders
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dynamic and it is a simple application of Darwinism to
economy.
Since, the “space of strategies” is enormous, finding
some “local maximum” of the fitness is nearly impossible.
Moreover it is unrealistic to assume that the action of
player i is independent of his belongings Mi,t and Si,t.
For these two reasons we i) parametrized the functions
Fi in terms of indicators Ik{p} and ii) we introduced a
restoring effect which tends to balance the ratio Si,t/Mi,t
to the current price pt. For the indicators we choose
moving time averages of combinations of time derivatives
of log pt (e.g. I1 = 〈∂t log pt〉, I2 = 〈∂
2
t log pt〉, I3 =
〈[∂t log pt]
2〉, etc). The time averages were done over a
time period of typically 10 ∼ 100 time steps [9]. Note
that considering time differences of log p and not of pt,
makes the indicators, and hence the strategies, depend on
relative fluctuations of pt and not on his absolute value.
The strategies were then parametrized by ℓ numbers ηi,k:
Xi,t = f
(
ℓ∑
k=1
ηi,kIk{p}
)
where f(x) is a non-linear function. The nonlinearity of
f(x) is introduced to mimic, to some extent, the behavior
of agents in a realistic market. Agents indeed sometimes
play “contrarian” strategies, i.e. strategies which do not
follow the trend. In a rally run, an agent may take ad-
vantage of short selling in anticipation of a reverse or
crush. Furthermore, f(x) must be less than 1, since it
represents the fraction of one agent’s stock moved in a
time step. Note also that large arguments of x occur for
example in the presence of wild fluctuations of pt. The
behavior of traders becomes in these cases very cautious,
which implies f(x) ≪ 1 for x large. To imitate these
behaviour we took f(x) = x/[1 + (x/2)4].
The amount of stock ∆Si,t agent i decides to sell
(∆Si,t < 0) or to buy (∆Si,t > 0) is given by
∆Si,t = Xi,tSi,t +
γiMi,t − ptSi,t
2τi
. (1)
Here the first term is pure speculation, whereas the sec-
ond introduces a dependence on Mi,t and Si,t in the ac-
tion of player i. In order to motivate this term, consider
the event where, for some reason the price remains con-
stant pt = p0 for a long period. A realistic behavior of the
agents in such a situation would be that to ri-equilibrate
their portfolio at their chosen level Si,t/Mi,t = p0/γi.
These operations at constant price do not change the
capitals Ci,t. On the contrary, having his assets equili-
brated at the actual price, a player is in the most favor-
able situation to face possible future price fluctuations of
either sign. The second term in eq. (1) reproduces this
behavior. Indeed if the price is constant, all indicators
Ik vanish and so do all speculation terms Xi,t. In the ab-
sence of the first term, the second equilibrates the ratio
Si,t/Mi,t to a value p/γi within a time of order τi.
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FIG. 1. Price history for a system of 1000 agents. The
parameters are ǫ = 0.01 and π = 10−3. In the lower part the
zoom of the area in the upper rectangle.
In summary the strategy of each player is parameter-
ized by ℓ + 2 numbers: ηi,1, . . . , ηi,ℓ, γi and τi. Once the
price pt is fixed, it is communicated to the players who
can decide their actions ∆Si,t. The transactions then
take place at this price pt. Let us define the total de-
mand and offer of stocks at time t
Dt =
∑
i:∆Si,t>0
∆Si,t Ot = −
∑
i:∆Si,t<0
∆Si,t.
When the demand is larger than the offer, the players
willing to buy ∆Si,t > 0 stocks will in fact be able to buy
only the available amount ∆¯Si,t = ∆Si,tOt/Dt, whereas
players who sell will sell all their −∆Si,t stocks (∆¯Si,t =
∆Si,t). The reverse situation will clearly apply if Dt <
Ot. Our model also includes a finite cost π∆Sit on the
buyers (π ∼ 10−3) and random fluctuations ǫi,tMi,t in
the cash of each agent (ǫi,t is a random variable uniformly
distributed in [−ǫ, ǫ]) which, loosely speaking, represents
the “heat bath” fluctuations due to all the other actions
of player i. These rules are summarized in the following
equation:
Si,t+1 = Si,t + ∆¯Si,t
Mi,t+1 = [1 + ǫi,t][Mi,t − pt(1 + π)∆¯Si,t]
}
if ∆¯Si,t > 0,
Si,t+1 = Si,t + ∆¯Si,t
Mi,t+1 = [1 + ǫi,t][Mi,t − pt∆¯Si,t]
}
if ∆¯Si,t < 0.
Next a new price pt+1 is determined. This is done
implementing the law of demand and offer in the form
pt+1 = pt
〈Dt〉
〈Ot〉
(2)
where the averages are, as before time averages. Note
that the price raises when there is a large demand and
falls when the offer is large. Also note that this form of
the law of demand and offer is dimensionally correct.
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FIG. 2. Probability F (x = 0, τ ) of price returns (i.e.
x = 0 ⇒ pt+τ = pt) vs τ . The parameters are the same
as in fig. 1.
Our numerical simulations are quite encouraging. De-
spite the simplicity and the arbitrariness of the strate-
gies, an extremely rich price history is created. A sample
of pt is shown in fig. 1. This shows fluctuations of all
sizes. Depending on the parameters, on long runs, also
some crushes occasionally occur, with almost no sign of
its coming. These crushes arise only as a result of collec-
tive trading activity. Apart from a simple “smoothing”
[9] which becomes more efficient in the presence of wild
fluctuations, our model does not implement the many
corrections which are taken in similar cases by central
authorities in a real market.
The signal is similar to that of stock prices or foreign
currencies. This impression is confirmed analyzing the
temporal signal. Recently quite a few empirical studies
have been carried out for the statistics of economics time
series, notably the Standard & Poor’s 500 index [3], and
high frequency foreign exchange data [5,6].
When comparing our statistical data, the definition of
time becomes a matter of concern. In our model the
time flows uniformly and the number of agents are fixed.
In a real economy there are periods of inactivity, when
the market closes, and the number of active agents varies
with time. This leads to systematic periodic variations
in the signal pt so that its fluctuations x = pt+τ − pt can
no longer be considered as a stationary variable. This
issue was discussed at length in ref. [6] where a time
transformation which eliminates these systematic effects
was introduced. Our model clearly does not contain these
systematic effects and therefore better compares with real
economic data in the transformed time [6].
Following refs. [3,5,6], let us define the histogram
F (x, τ) of price variations x = pt+τ − pt. Figure 2
shows that the scaling behavior of the the price “returns”
F (0, τ) is very similar to that observed in a real economy,
it behaves like τ−H with an exponent H ≃ 0.62.
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FIG. 3. Upper part: histogram of price variations for sev-
eral values of τ . Lower part: collapse plot of the previous
data with H = 0.62. The parameters are the same as in fig.
1.
The full distribution F (x, τ) is shown in figure 3 for
several values of τ . These distributions satisfy the scaling
hypothesis
F (x, τ) = τ−HF
(
xτ−H , 1
)
= τHg
(
xτ−H
)
, (3)
with an exponent H = 0.62, as shown in the lower part of
fig. 3. This is very similar to the behavior of prices in a
real economy. The tails of the distributions have a power
law character F (x, τ) ∼ x−α with exponent α close to 2.
This differs from what is seen in real economic data where
either the exponent is larger (≈ 4.5 [6]) or the decay is
more rapid [3]. We believe that this is due to the fact
that the tail of the distribution describes extreme events.
Under extreme events, in a real economy, the rules of the
game change drastically. On the contrary in our model
the rules are always the same no matter what fluctuations
pt may suffer.
In the stationary state, one can classify the traders ac-
cording to their wealth. Zipf [8] has observed that the
distribution of economic power among individuals of a
society follow a well defined power law, hence the name
Zipf’s law. In our artificial society we plot the assets
distribution in the Zipf’s fashion where the capital C(n)
of the nth richer person is plotted against the order n.
Figure 4 shows this law (note that the plot refers to one
single snapshot of a system of 1000 agents). Our ex-
ponent ≈ −1.2 is not too far from Zipf’s value for the
distribution of cooperation assets [8].
With respect to the robustness of the results, we found
that particular care has to be paid in order to avoid
crushes and singularities in the market. For all choices of
parameters yielding a stable behavior, we found similar
results. But, for example, including “copying”,i.e. the
possibility for a poor to copy the strategy of a richer,
changes the exponent H from 0.62 to 0.5. Interestingly,
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FIG. 4. The capitals C(n) owned by each player in order
of richness. The parameters are the same as in fig. 1.
in the model with copying, we also detected a multiscal-
ing behavior of the same form of the one discussed in
[5]. A weak multiscaling, or no multiscaling at all, was
instead found in the dynamics without copying.
In conclusion we find realistic behavior in a simple
model for a stock market without external driving. The
players trade in an non-ending fight against each other
to survive. Such a dynamic system produce a non trivial
time series behind, which records all the infighting and
ingenuity of the players trying to out-guess others. Sim-
ple signal forms are expected to be excluded since they
are too easy to anticipate. The result is a signal with
all the surprises of all sizes (for the traders as well as for
us!). We have purposely excluded any real information
input, our results nevertheless show close resemblance to
real markets. This suggests that the statistics we observe
in real markets is mainly due to the interaction among
“speculators” trading on technical grounds, regardless of
economic fundamentals. Indeed it is known that in For-
eign exchange markets the trades by speculators far out-
numbers the trades due to real commercial needs.
It is clear that by no means one can conclude that
our model captures all the relevant aspects of a real mar-
ket. As already said it misses the effects of external drive.
More importantly, it does not contain adaptive dynamics
of the player’s strategies. Further studies should answer
the question: what are the essential elements in a model
that will reproduce realistic results? In this perspective
our model can be considered as a first step in this chal-
lenging direction.
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